





















































































































































Is the International Role of the Dollar 
Changing?
Linda S. Goldberg
Recently the U.S. dollar’s preeminence as an international 
currency has been questioned. The emergence of the euro, changes 
in the dollar’s value, and the ﬁ  nancial market crisis have, in the 
view of many commentators, posed a signiﬁ  cant challenge to the 
currency’s long-standing position in world markets. However, 
a study of the dollar across critical areas of international trade 
and ﬁ  nance suggests that the dollar has retained its standing 
in key roles. While changes in the global status of the dollar are 
possible, factors such as inertia in currency use, the large size 
and relative stability of the U.S. economy, and the dollar pricing 
of oil and other commodities will help perpetuate the dollar’s role 
as the dominant medium for international transactions.
B
y many measures, the U.S. dollar is the most important currency in the world. 
It plays a central role in international trade and ﬁ  nance as both a store of value 
and a medium of exchange. Many countries have adopted an exchange rate 
regime that anchors the value of their home currency to that of the dollar. Dollar 
holdings ﬁ  gure prominently in ofﬁ  cial foreign exchange (FX) reserves—the foreign 
currency deposits and bonds maintained by monetary authorities and governments. 
And in international trade, the dollar is widely used for invoicing and settling import 
and export transactions around the world.
Periodically, however, the dollar’s preeminence as a cross-national currency has 
been questioned. The emergence of the euro in 1999 as a major currency and global 
competitor fueled the debate over the dollar’s international role. More recently, the 
global shortage of dollars during the ﬁ  nancial market crisis placed extraordinary 
strains on international ﬁ  rms needing to support their dollar-denominated assets 
and led to calls for changes in the international monetary system. Several developing 
countries, for example, have proposed that for certain transactions the dollar be 
replaced with a type of “world” currency based on International Monetary Fund 
special drawing rights. In addition, participants at the April 2009 meeting of the 
Group of Twenty ﬁ  nance ministers raised questions about the dollar’s preeminence 
as a reserve currency, and People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan has 
pressed for a shift away from U.S. currency in various activities. 
A change in the dominant role of the dollar in world markets would have conse-
quences for the currency issuer and users alike. The dollar’s international status helps 
insulate the U.S. economy from foreign shocks, reduces transaction costs in trade and 
ﬁ  nance, and contributes to the international transmission of U.S. shocks and mon-
etary policy effects. For foreign economies, broad use of the dollar in reserves and in 
international transactions typically results in greater sensitivity of trade, inﬂ  ation, 2
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and asset values to exchange rate movements between their cur-
rencies and the dollar. Furthermore, dollar banknotes—physical 
bills of different denominations—used abroad provide some 
foreign households and businesses with a more stable store of 
value and a sounder transaction currency, especially during 
periods of turbulence overseas.
This edition of Current Issues examines the role of the dollar 
across several key areas of international trade and ﬁ  nance. In 
each area, we provide evidence that the dollar retains its status 
as the dominant international currency in all major categories 
of use. We also touch on the factors that may have contributed to 
this continuing strength. One such factor is inertia in currency 
use in certain transactions.1 That is, the dollar’s established 
and deep role in international markets may make it difﬁ  cult for 
users to shift to a less entrenched currency. A second factor is the 
tendency of users to favor the currency of countries that have 
large economies and relatively strong output and employment 
growth as well as low and stable inﬂ  ation. Finally, users may be 
predisposed to choose the dollar because it is linked to their own 
currency through their exchange rate regime and because key 
commodities such as oil and metals are priced in dollars.
While our evidence overall suggests that the dollar is likely 
to remain prominent as an international currency, its primacy 
cannot be taken for granted. The pound sterling entered the 
twentieth century as the dominant reserve currency but was later 
overtaken by the dollar.2 This observation serves as a reminder 
that—despite present trends—transitions are possible. 
The Dollar as International Cash
The dollar is a major form of cash currency around the world. 
The share of U.S. dollar banknotes estimated to be held outside 
the United States is substantial (Chart 1).3 Roughly 75 percent 
of hundred-dollar notes, 55 percent of ﬁ  fty-dollar notes, and 
60 percent of twenty-dollar notes are held abroad, while about 
65 percent of all U.S. banknotes are in circulation outside the 
country. Approximately $580 billion in physical U.S. currency 
outstanding was circulating overseas at the end of March 2009. 
The stability of the U.S. dollar makes it an attractive currency 
in countries that are experiencing volatile economic and politi-
cal conditions or that have histories of such risks.4 Although 
estimates of regional holdings can be imprecise, the bulk of 
dollar banknotes appear to be held in Russia, in former Soviet 
Union states, and in Latin America. In recent years, euros have 
1 See Krugman (1980).
2 The timing of this shift is debated. Eichengreen and Flandreau (2008) argue 
that the dollar ﬁ  rst overtook sterling in the mid-1920s. Chinn and Frankel (2008) 
suggest that the change occurred after World War II.
3 See U.S. Treasury Department (2006). Also see Table USCC-2, “U.S. Currency and 
Coin Outstanding and in Circulation,” published in the U.S. Treasury Department 
Bulletin.
4 See Hellerstein and Ryan (2009) for the forces inﬂ  uencing U.S. cash dollar 
holdings in foreign markets.
also played a greater role as international cash, circulating more 
extensively outside the euro-area borders. Nevertheless, this 
physical currency is held mainly in countries in proximity to the 
euro area.5
Foreign holdings of U.S. banknotes offer some limited ad-
vantages to the United States. For example, the holdings create a 
larger base over which the country collects seigniorage.6 One way 
to estimate the seigniorage, or savings, that the United States de-
rives from its currency held abroad is to compute a rate of return 
based on the interest earned on the Treasury portfolio held by the 
Federal Reserve; this calculation suggests annual savings of more 
than $30 billion.7 However, these savings are offset somewhat by 
the costs to the United States of maintaining a currency outside 
national boundaries—for example, the expenses associated with 
controlling counterfeiting and providing depository vaults for new 
currency available to be exchanged for old dollars. 
The beneﬁ  ts derived by the foreign holders of U.S. banknotes 
are potentially more substantial. Many of these holders enjoy 
a better store of value and an improved medium of exchange 
5 See European Central Bank (2009).
6 The macroeconomic concept of seigniorage is often deﬁ  ned as a type of inﬂ  ation 
tax: When an entity accepts banknotes (or currency) at a point in time, the 
accepted banknotes have a speciﬁ  c exchange value in current goods and services. 
However, if there is inﬂ  ation, when the banknotes are exchanged back into goods 
and services at some future time, the amount of goods and services will be 
reduced because their price has become higher. This phenomenon represents 
a gain to the currency issuer and a tax on the currency holder. On the Federal 
Reserve balance sheet, seigniorage is represented by holdings of non-interest-
bearing currency in lieu of, for example, interest-bearing Treasury bills. The value 
of seigniorage is the interest-expense savings less the cost of maintaining the 
currency in circulation.
7 Calculations are based on the annual reports of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. For assets, we use the tables entitled “Federal Reserve 
Bank Holdings of U.S. Treasury and Federal Agency Securities,” selecting “U.S. 
Treasury Securities Held Outright.” For interest, we use the tables entitled “Federal 
Reserve Banks’ Combined Statements of Income,” which present interest income 
on U.S. government securities.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimates, based on U. S. Treasury 
Department (2006). 
Chart 1










04 02 00 98 96 94 92 1990
$50s
$20s
All banknotesrelative to their home currencies, especially when local macro-
economic and political conditions are risky. Still, foreign nations 
lose the seigniorage they otherwise might have collected if their 
own currency were fully in use locally.
The Dollar in Exchange Rate Arrangements 
and FX Reserves
The dollar serves as a central currency in the exchange rate 
arrangements of many countries. When a country to some degree 
ﬁ  xes its exchange rate in relation to the dollar, it is making a 
commitment to monetary and sometimes ﬁ  scal policies aimed 
at maintaining a stable value of its currency relative to the dollar. 
While monetary policy tools in the foreign economy generally 
could be used to achieve other goals, such as inﬂ  uencing inﬂ  ation 
or output directly, when the currency value is kept within rigid 
bounds relative to the dollar, monetary policy instead tends to be 
directed at maintaining the bilateral currency value. 
A useful measure of the dollar’s prominence in this area of 
international ﬁ  nance is the number of countries with dollar-
based exchange rate arrangements. To determine that ﬁ  gure, we 
group currency arrangements according to whether countries 
have dollarized or have formed currency boards using the dollar, 
have a pegged exchange rate against the dollar, or maintain 
managed ﬂ  oats with the dollar as a reference currency (Table 1). 
Exchange rate arrangements can be difﬁ  cult to categorize, 
however, with de facto arrangements often different from 
reported de jure arrangements. Although the information in the 
table is drawn from a prominent 2004 study by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (updated in Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff [2008]), there 
is no consensus on the identiﬁ  cation of these regimes. Other 
categorizations include those provided by the International 
Monetary Fund in its report “Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions” and in research by Shambaugh (2004) 
and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). Each study reaches 
different conclusions about the exchange rate regimes of coun-
tries because of differences between de jure and de facto regimes 
and because the de facto regimes are deﬁ  ned using alternative 
methods and assumptions. 
According to the Reinhart and Rogoff categorizations (Table 1), 
seven countries currently are dollarized or have currency boards 
using the dollar and eighty-nine have a pegged exchange rate against 
the dollar. The share of countries linking their currency to the dollar 
in some manner has been stable since 1995, and this group repre-
sents more than a third of world GDP (excluding the United States).
Another indicator of the dollar’s status is its prominence in 
the portfolios of foreign governments’ foreign exchange reserve 
accounts. These reserve balances, which are essentially the gov-
ernments’ foreign currency savings, can be quite large. Foreign 
exchange reserve holdings grew sharply over the past decade 
and exceeded $7 trillion in 2008 (Chart 2). Developing countries 
accounted for most of the increase, with China taking the lead. 
Indeed, as of ﬁ  rst-quarter 2009, China held 46 percent of the 
reserves of developing countries.
In 2009, dollar assets accounted for about two-thirds of 
the reserve assets of industrialized and developing countries 
(Chart 3). Among industrialized countries, a sharp jump in the 
dollar share occurred between 1995 and 2000. The rise can be 
explained primarily by changes in the reserve holdings of euro-
area countries. With the introduction of the euro, the legacy 
currency reserves of euro-area countries—the deutsche marks, 
francs, lira, and other currencies replaced by the euro—were 
reclassiﬁ  ed as local currencies and therefore were no longer con-
sidered foreign currency reserves; this shift in the composition 
of the countries’ reserve portfolios meant that the dollar assumed 
a much larger share of the remaining reserves. Subsequently, the 
dollar share declined only modestly in the portfolios of industri-
alized countries. 
  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   3
Source: International Monetary Fund, Currency Composition of Official Foreign 
Exchange Reserves (COFER) data.
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Countries Reporting U.S.-Dollar–Based 
Exchange Rate Arrangements 
Number of Countries
Arrangement 1995 2000 2005 2007 
Dollarized or formed 
currency  board    9    8    7    7 
Pegged exchange rate regime 
against  dollar     82    85    90    89
Maintained managed ﬂ  oats with 
dollar  as  reference  currency    6    8    6    8
Total  reporting    207   207   207   207
Memo:
Currency linked to dollar (percent)    47     49     50     50
Gross domestic product linked 
to  dollar  (percent)    21    29    31    36
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004); Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008); 
author’s calculations.4
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Chart 3 also shows that the reported dollar share in the reserve 
portfolios of developing countries appears to have declined over 
the past decade. However, such an interpretation is misleading. 
Most of the decline reﬂ  ects the dollar’s depreciation between 2005 
and 2008, which raised the value, and hence the share, of other 
currencies in the portfolios. If we adjust the portfolio shares to 
be valued at constant exchange rates, the dollar share in develop-
ing countries’ reserve portfolios has actually been quite stable 
since 2000. Furthermore, although a decline in reserve holdings 
occurred during the global ﬁ  nancial crisis, the dollar share of 
reserve holdings for both industrialized and developed countries 
remained high.
There is a long history of debate on the prospect of a change in 
the dollar’s role in international reserve portfolios. Over the past 
decade, many commentators have discussed whether the advent 
of the euro in 1999 would reduce that role. The theme recurred in 
the context of the sustainability of the U.S. current account deﬁ  cit. 
More recently, the dollar’s place in foreign currency reserves has 
received renewed attention. People’s Bank of China Governor 
Zhou Xiaochuan has called for a shift away from the dollar, while 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has conﬁ  rmed the 
currency’s continuing central role.8 The dollar’s prominence as 
a reserve currency was also discussed at the April 2009 meeting 
of the Group of Twenty ﬁ  nance ministers. Needless to say, the 
composition of reserve holdings is not mandated by the central 
bodies of the international monetary system, but instead is 
decided by individual countries. Among the reasons cited for a 
possible change in the dollar’s role are the relatively high growth 
rates of other parts of the world, the large size of the euro area, 
8 See http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6500&ID=178 and 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg68.htm, respectively.
and potential changes in patterns of economic and military 
strength.9
A shift away from dollar assets, including Treasury securities, 
could be a concern for the United States if divestiture triggers 
higher funding costs. In the extreme, private investors could spur 
a run on dollar assets that leads to a destabilizing fall in the value 
of the currency and a sharp rise in U.S. interest rates. However, 
such a drastic outcome appears unlikely.
Overall, despite market turbulence and substantial move-
ments in the value of the dollar over the past decade, the dollar 
has not declined in prominence either as a central currency for 
exchange rate arrangements or as an international reserve cur-
rency. The future of the dollar in this context continues to be the 
subject of discussion and policy statements, but the currency’s 
status has been maintained.
The Dollar in the FX Markets and as an Invoicing Currency 
The dollar is a leading transaction currency in the foreign 
exchange markets and a key invoicing currency in international 
trade. With an 86 percent share of FX transaction volume—more 
than twice the share of the euro—the dollar continues to domi-
nate these markets (Table 2). Turnover volumes in the foreign 
exchange markets have more than doubled in the past decade, 
implying large numbers of transactions measured in reference 
to, or involving, the dollar. In the FX markets, higher transaction 
volumes contribute to lower bid-ask spreads and reduced implicit 
transaction costs for using dollars—advantages that in turn 
reinforce the use of the dollar in these transactions. This self-
reinforcing pattern exempliﬁ  es the inertia phenomenon described 
earlier: Once a currency has an established and deep role in inter-
national markets, it is not easily displaced from this role. 
Another likely contributor to the dollar’s leading role in 
foreign exchange transactions is the currency’s widespread use 
in the invoicing of international trade. To assess the prevalence of 
the dollar as an invoicing currency, we compare the percentage of 
each country’s exports invoiced in dollars with the percentage of 
the country’s total exports destined for the United States (Chart 4). 
This exercise reveals the extent to which foreign producers choose 
the dollar as a “vehicle currency” for their trade with nations 
other than the United States. 
In the chart, the diagonal line represents a situation in which 
all of the dollar invoicing of a country’s exports is explained by 
the U.S. share of the country’s total exports. In other words, if all 
exports to the United States were invoiced in dollars, and these 
were the only exports invoiced this way, the chart’s twenty-four 
country observations would fall along the diagonal line. However, 
the observations are signiﬁ  cantly to the right of the line, indicating 
9 The prospects of the dollar as an international reserve currency have been 
studied by Chinn and Frankel (2007) and Papaioannou and Portes (2008), among 
others; the papers cited argue that the euro is poised for a more prominent future 
role. Also see the papers in Pisani-Ferry and Posen (2009).
Chart 3
U.S. Dollar Assets in Foreign Currency Reserves
Percent
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Currency Composition of Official Foreign 
Exchange Reserves (COFER) data; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
staff estimates.
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that use of the dollar in export invoicing is substantial and far 
exceeds what could be explained by country exports to the United 
States. This reliance on the dollar for invoicing exports to nations 
other than the United States may reﬂ  ect inertia in currency 
use, the large size and relatively stability of the U.S. economy, or 
exchange rate arrangements that link the currency of the destina-
tion country or the exporting country to the dollar. In addition, 
it may reﬂ  ect the incentive for exporters to limit the movements 
of their prices relative to those of competitors by choosing the 
invoicing currency used by the majority of producers in the 
industry. A ﬁ  nal factor is the incentive to invoice in a currency 
that offers the best hedge against cost ﬂ  uctuations stemming 
from relevant movements in aggregate demand and wages in the 
source and destination countries (Goldberg and Tille 2008).
It is reasonable to consider whether the advent of the euro has 
changed dollar use as a currency for invoicing international trade. 
Research on the evolution of invoicing patterns over time ﬁ  nds 
that the euro has not substantially eroded the use of dollars for 
this purpose.10 The euro is used extensively for invoicing trade 
of the sixteen countries that have adopted the currency—both in 
transactions among themselves and with other markets—but not 
broadly in other regions. This activity is well documented by the 
European Central Bank (2009) in a series of reports on the inter-
national role of the euro and in related research by Kamps (2006) 
and Goldberg (2007). Other research shows that dollar use in the 
invoicing of international trade is associated with relatively low 
transmission of exchange rate movements to U.S. import prices 
and thus a reduced impact of exchange rate movements on U.S. 
consumers (Goldberg and Tille 2006; Goldberg and Dillon 2007). 
10 Goldberg and Tille (2008, 2009); Goldberg (2007).
The Dollar in International Financial Transactions
The international debt markets are another area in which the 
dollar serves as a prominent currency.11 The currency’s status is 
exempliﬁ  ed by the share of all outstanding debt securities, issued 
anywhere in the world, denominated in dollars. According to this 
measure, the dollar’s share stands at approximately 39 percent, 
down only slightly from a high of 42 percent in 1999 (Chart 5). 
Another key gauge is the dollar-denominated share of all securi-
ties sold outside the issuing country and in a currency different 
from that of the issuer’s country. This narrower measure—termed 
“international debt securities” in the chart—suggests that the dol-
lar also continues to be a signiﬁ  cant currency for debt when bor-
rowers turn to external markets and foreign currency ﬁ  nancing. In 
2009, the dollar accounted for almost half of these debt securities.
An analysis of currency use by region suggests that in debt 
issuance by individuals and governments, as in other areas of 
international trade and ﬁ  nance, the euro has not had a sizable 
impact on the dollar. The dollar remains the primary ﬁ  nancing 
currency for issuers in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and 
the Paciﬁ  c area. The euro dominates issuances in Scandinavia, 
the United Kingdom, and the new member states of the European 
Union. Issuers in Africa rely on dollars and euros about equally.
The dollar also plays an important role in the cross-border 
foreign currency liabilities of banks in countries that report data 
to the Bank for International Settlements. These outstanding 
liabilities are to creditors outside the reporting country and in a 
currency other than that of the reporting country. Over the past 
decade, such liabilities have grown substantially with respect to 
bank and nonbank counterparties (Chart 6), with liabilities to 
nonbanks (including money market mutual funds) expanding 
slightly faster than liabilities to banks.
11 For more detail, see European Central Bank (2009), Coeurdacier and Martin 
(2007), and Thimann (2008).
Table 2
Turnover in Traditional Foreign Exchange Markets
Percent 
Currency 1995 2001 2004 2007
U.S.  dollar    83.3    90.3    88.7    86.3
Euro    53.7a    37.6    36.9    37.0
Yen    24.1    22.7    20.2    16.5
Other industrialized 
 currenciesb    24.2    33.9    38.6    40.5
Emerging market
currencies    8.5    16.9    15.4    19.8
Memo:
Average daily turnover 
 (billions of U.S. dollars)     1,150     1,420     1,970     3,210
Source: Bank for International Settlements.  
Note: Currency shares total 200 percent in each column because each transaction 
involves two currencies.
a Legacy currencies replaced by the euro include the deutsche mark, French franc, 
Netherlands guilder, and European Currency Unit.
bCurrencies are the pound sterling, Swiss franc, Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, 
Swedish krona, Norwegian krone, New Zealand dollar, and Danish krone. 
Source: Goldberg and Tille (2008).  
Note: Observations cover various years from 2000 to 2007.
Chart 4
Dollar Use in the Invoicing of Exports
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The dollar continues to claim a dominant share of these 
cross-border liabilities to both nonbank and bank counterparties 
(Chart 7). The slight decline in the dollar share in recent years 
is likely attributable to measures that use current, rather than 
constant, exchange rates.
Further evidence of the dollar’s continued prominence is 
provided by the strong dollar funding needs of non-U.S. banks 
during the recent ﬁ  nancial market turbulence.12 Data on cross-
border-liability denominations show that by June 2008, non-U.S. 
banks had accumulated approximately $27 trillion in cross-border 
liabilities denominated in currencies other than that of their home 
country. More than $18 trillion of this amount was denominated 
in dollars. Accordingly, when the credit markets tightened, these 
banks had substantial dollar funding needs.13 The disruption of 
dollar availability abroad was partially addressed by the foreign 
exchange swap lines established between the Federal Reserve and 
other central banks.14 During the early stages of the recent crisis, 
prior to the expansion of the swap lines, the volumes of dollars 
available and drawn upon totaled less than $70 billion. By the end 
of 2008, expansion of dollar availability through the central bank 
dollar swap lines, combined with the growing ﬁ  nancing needs out-
side the United States, brought amounts drawn by central banks to 
12  This phenomenon is explored in detail by McGuire and von Peter (2009). 
Disruptions to the supply of dollars during the ﬁ  nancial turmoil were partially 
addressed when the Federal Reserve created and expanded foreign currency swap 
facilities with other central banks. The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility 
and reciprocal currency arrangements with other central banks increased the 
available supply of dollars. In some cases, the Federal Reserve acted as a dollar 
lender of last resort to some segments of the ﬁ  nancial sector.
13 See Coffey et al. (2009).
14 See Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2010).
more than $560 billion. The trade activity and range of ﬁ  nancial 
transactions associated with these ﬁ  gures suggest that the dollar 
remains a leading transaction currency.
Conclusion
The international role of the dollar remains substantial a decade 
after the introduction of the euro, and despite changes in the value 
of the dollar and the ﬁ  nancial turmoil that began in 2007. Use of 
the currency abroad continues to have a range of consequences 
Source: European Central Bank (ECB) estimates using Thomson Financial data. 
Note: The “all debt securities” measure corresponds to the ECB series on “global” 
debt securities; the “international debt securities” measure corresponds to the ECB 
“narrow” measure—defined as securities sold outside the issuing country, excluding 
debt in the issuer’s own currency.
Chart 5
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for the United States. In general, it helps insulate the U.S. economy 
from foreign shocks, reduces transaction costs in trade and 
ﬁ  nance, and extends the international transmission of U.S. policy. 
For non-U.S. economies, broad use of the currency in reserves and 
in international transactions is typically associated with greater 
sensitivity of trade, inﬂ  ation, and asset values to international 
movements in the value of the dollar.
As the size and structure of the global economy change, 
international currency use may change as well. Despite evidence 
of the dollar’s vitality, the currency’s preeminence could diminish 
in the future. Indeed, historical precedent exists for the rise and 
fall of the international status of currencies. In the ﬁ  rst half of 
the twentieth century, for example, the dollar overtook the pound 
sterling as the dominant reserve currency. 
Changes to the global economy could have major implications 
for the international transmission of shocks, the value of the dollar, 
and welfare across economies. Accordingly, it seems important 
for policymakers to monitor use of the dollar in international 
economic activity and to understand the potential causes and 
consequences of the dollar’s changing international role.  
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